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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS EACH AND
EVERY ONE OF·THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT.

The appellants have stated their version of the facts
at great length, quoting in full many parts of the
Complaint and Findings and Conclusions. However, the
statement does not fully r~veal all of the evidence, but
only such portions as support appellant's contentions.
It will be noted at the outset that respondent in
paragraph II of his Amended Complaint sets forth the
basic coercive forces upon which he relied throughout the
trial. 'There were three in number.
(1) That unless plaintiff resigned his position as
a fireman first grade J. K. Piercey would blast and
smear respondent in every newspaper in Salt Lake City.
This the court did not find was substantiated by the
evidence, and respondent in his testimony did not testify
that that was what Piercey had said to him. Respondent
stated that the following occurred (R. 37):
you~

'' Q.

Then what did he say to

''A.

He told me I had to work somewhere; that
I wasn't going to work there no more, and
if I didn't resign I was going to he discharged, and I told him I wouldn't resign.

'' Q.

Was there any further conversation between you and ·Chief Piercey there at his
office on this morning~
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''A.

(2)

Yes. He told me if I didn't resign he wa.s
going to blast me and make it n1iserable fo'r
me to find a job. I told him I wouldn't
resign.''

That Piercey further told respondent he would

make it so miserable respondent could not secure a job
in Salt Lake City. Respondent did not testify that Mr.
Piercey would make it impossible f'Or him to find a job,
but only that it would be difficult for respondent to find
employment (R. 40).

•-'Q.

(By Mr. King) lvfr. F·ox, I will ask you,
what was your primary consideration in
the signing of this resigna th)n on that occasion, in your mind~ 'Vhat was uppern1ost
in your mind~

"A.

I didn't want him to carry out his threats
on me.

'' Q.

By 'threats' . what do you mean, 1v.fr. Fox?

''A.

lie said he would blast me and swear me
all over the newspapers; and if he did, it
would be difficult in obtaining en1ployment.

"Q.

Did you have any intention at that time,
Mr. Fox, of resigning your position with
the Fire Department voluntarily~

"A.

I did not."

( 3)

That if respondent did not resign his position

Piercey would discharge him and ~ve him n1ore pub-:licity than he ever wanted in his life. There is no dispute
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on the threat of discharge. Concerning the publicity respondent stated as follows (R. 39') :
''A.

Rather than have Chief Piercey carry out
his threats, the best thing to do was resifffi,
and save face with the family.

'' Q.

What did you do, Mr.

"A.

I went hack and asked him if it was too
late to resign.

''Q.

Did you have any other conversation with
him when you went back~

''A.

I asked him, if I resigned if he would retract his stories he was going to put in the
newspapers.

''Q.

What did he

''A.

He says it was too late. He said, if it wasn't
too late, he would try. ''

Fox~

say~

The court in its Findings of Fact found specifically
In Finding No. 1 that Piercey told respondent unless
he resigned he would be discharged and the discharge would be accompanied by detrimental publicity
and would seriously and detrimentally affect r~spond
ent's opportunity for obtaining employment in Salt Lake
City and vicinity (R. 24). The court further found that
the threat by Piercey to respondent alarmed and
frightened him and while he was under -the influence
of fear, duress and coercion caused and created by the
statements of Piercey concerning the detrimental effect
that a discharge would have upon the respondent's op·
portunity for employment and the detrimental publicity
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that 'vould probably result fron1 such discharge, acted
inYoluntarily and signed the letter of resignation involved in this action (R. 25).
Respondent's testin1ony standing alone would be
ample support for all of the Findings of Fact made by
the Court. But his evidence does not stand alone. It is
bolstered and corroborated by all of the testimony of the
·w-itnesses for appellants. Piercey and every one of the
Assistant Chiefs agreed that prior to his resignation
Chief Piercey told the plaintiff that it would be better
for him to resign than to be discharged. Of course, there
is a Yariance in the testimony concerning just exactly
what Piercey said. ~Jost of the Assistant Chiefs denied
that Piercey n1ention_ed ne,vspaper publicity, but it vvould
seem that this omission was an oversight on the part
of Piercey for he certainly had newspaper publicity in
1nind 'vhen respondent 'vas before him and his Assistant
Chiefs. He had already been contacted by the papers
concerning a statement on respondent and had released
the following information to them (Exhibit "D"):
''PIERCEY OUSTS S. L. FIREMAN
"A Salt Lake fireman \Vas discharged Friday h~v Fire Chief J. K. Piercey following his
arrest Thursday night on a_drunkenness charge.
"Discharged was Harold F·ox, 37, 227 N. 6th
West. He 'vas arrested at his home :Thursday at
11 :10 p.m. by police officers. He pleaded innocent
to a drunkenness charge Friday before Police
Judge Frank E. Moss, who set triaJ for Aug. 2'6.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''Chief Piercey, in a letter Friday to Public
Safety Commissioner L. C. Romney and the board
of city commissioners, said he had discharged
Fox and recommended the commission concur in
in his action.
"While the letter was being submitted to the
city commission, Fox voluntarily sub1nitted his
resignation to Chief Piercey, \vho said it would be
accepted.
"The chief said he talked to Fox in city jail
Thursday night and Fox admitted drinking and
striking a wo1nan neighbor. Chief Piercey added
Fox had been warned and disciplined previously
for similar conduct."
Assistant Chief 'Vhite is the only one of the witnesses for appellants who admitted that newsp:aper publicity was discussed with respondent (R. 146):
''A.

The Chief did mention the newspapers had
called him, that they had the information
about the evening before and they knewhe had told them Mr. Fox had been discharged. I believe Mr. Fox asked him if
it could be stopped, if the newspapers
couldn't be called and the story stopped.
I know the Chief made a call to the newspapers and attempted to stop the story at
that time.''

At the trial Assistant Chief White did not recall
any discussion of adverse p·ublicity between respondent
and Piercey until respondent's counsel quoted to him
part of the record on the Civil S-ervice Commission hearSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing. The following questions and answers appear {R.

147-149):
'' Q.

Mr. White, on the hearing before the Civil
Service Commission, you stated, did you
not, that Chief Piercey did tell ~Ir. Fox
that he vvould have some troubles, though,
if he didn't resign, getting other employment, and those troubles would stem from .
the Fire Department~

"A.

That vvas his advice to Mr. Fox, that it
\Vould be harder for him if on the reeord
of the Department vvas the fact ·he had
been discharged. If people called, it would
look much better if there vvas just the
resignation present.

"Q.

In answer to that question did you make
the following answer, concerning what
Chief Piercey had told 1\fr. F·ox :
'Well, as far as dismissal was concerned,
that it would be pretty much a matter of public knowledge of what \Vent on, especially if
I-Iarold wanted to fight a discharge, that
there would be a lot of court action. On the
other hand, if he would resign, he would be
spared all that.
'He 1nade particular reference to the
fact that Harold vvould have to have work of
some kind, and as he was seeking a position
son1where else, these people would call the
Chief's office for a recommendation, or his
record on the Fire Departn1ent, that with the
resignation he \Vould have a clearer casethat the Chief would simply tell him then he
had resigned from the Fire Department.
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'On the other hand, if he was discharged,
then he would probably have to answer the
questions as to reason for dismissal.'
''Do you remember the Chief telling Mr. Fox
that, Chief \Vhite ~
''A.

Yes, I think that is right.

'' Q.

In other words, the thing the Chief was
impressing upon Mr. Fox was, was it not,
if he resigned he would have a good chance
of getting employment in Salt Lake City,
and if he was discharged, he would not~

''A.

Well, ·he didn't say he would not.

'' Q.

He gave him that impression, didn't he,
Chief White~

"MR. HO;LGR,EN: I object to that as calling
for a conclusion.
''THE COURT: Objection sustained.

"Q.

(By Mr. King) In answer to the following
question didn't you make the following
answer, before the Civil Service Commission, on this matter:
'In other words, Chief Piercey told Mr.
Fox if be resigned, his chances for getting
employment were much better than if he
were discharged as a result of the things
Chief Piercey would have to tell people,
when they called, regarding Mr. Fox~'
"D"d
1 n 't you answer that question:

'Yes, that is right.'
"A.

I did, yes."
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At many other places in the testimony of the Assistant Chiefs, respondent's story is eorroborated and confirmed even though it appears throughout their testimony that they 'vere avoiding assiduously any inference
that Piercey was using every coercive force which he
possessed to obtain a resignation fron1 respondent.
The withdrawal of resp·ondent's resignation occurred within two days of the time that it was given and
no harm could possibly ha,ve been done. to the Fire Department or Salt Lake City by the issuance of a discharge \vhen the resignation was withdra-\vn, yet Piercey
has steadfastly refused to discharge respondent. The
only explanation for such a refusal is that admittedly
there is no cause for discharge. Since there was no lawful grounds for discharge the threat of discharge by
Piercey was wrongful-and unlawful.
Respondent's record as a fireman was clear of any
violation of his duties. 'The only criti~ism of respondent's conduct concerned the family difficulties with
which he \Vas afflicted. No one has ever intimated that
those personal problems in any vvay affected respondent's proficiency a.s a fireman.
This court has held that the fact that a ~ireman does
not live his private personal life in accordance with the
view of his superiors is not grounds for discharge or
cause for removal. Thompson v. Civil SerV'ice Com.mission, 103 Utah 162, 134 P. 2d 188. In the Thomp!SOn case
the Fire Chief was admittedly guilty of a positive violation of law (driving on the wrong side of the street
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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while drunk). Here respondent was found not guilty
of being drunk in his own home.
The law under the modern VIew of duress and
coercion is to the effect that the threat need not be such
as would put a brave man or even a man of ordinary
firmness in fear. The question for the court to decide
is subjective, i.e., did the statements and threats put
respondent in fear and preclude hi1n from exercising his
free will and

judgment~

In deciding that question the

court should consider the relation of the parties and the
attendant circumstances.
His H·onor, of course, realized that respondent \vas
an inferior subordinate, \vith very little prestige or
standing in the Fire Department or general community,
while Piercey was the Chief of the department and an
influential

citiz~n

in the community with access to all

of the newspap:ers in Salt Lake City, and with a great
many other means of carrying out his \vill and desires.
This feeling on the part of respondent came ·before the
court from the following questions and answers (R. 65):

"Q.

Mr. Fox, was there anything other-! think
you answered a question of Mr. Hohngren's about publishing in the newspaper.
Was there any other part of what Chief
Piercey said to you that you were thinking
about when you went hack and decided to
resign, other than the publishing in the
newspaper~
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~ •.l\..

I kne'v that him being as influential as he
'vas, that he could have a great bearing on
me finding employment.

'' Q.

Had he said anything about that to you in
the m~orning meeting~
-

''.A..

He told me he \vas going to blast me and
smear me in every newspaper in Salt Lake
City.''

.A_ great deal of testimony dealt 'vith an incident
which occurred on January 30th, 1946, and primarily
coneerned a letter \Yhich respondent signed and which is
marked Exhibit "1". The testimony concerning that
letter, 'vhile immaterial on the main question here, illustrates the practice of the Fire Department and ~of the
Assistant Chiefs in o.btainng compliance from inferior
officers with the Chief's and Assistant Chiefs' wishes.
In the letter the Assistant Chiefs req:uired respondent
to sign ther·e is a statement that no duress or coercion
was used. against respondent to 'Obtain his signature yet,
everyone that testified adrni tted that they threatened
respondent vvith immediate discharge unless he signed
the letter as written.

A worthwhile civil service system requires that the
civil servant be free from coercive pressure from his.
superior officers. The provisions for discharge give
a1nple protection to the City and the Chief of the Fire
Department. If the gate is left open for the use of coercive measures by the superior officers every salutary
purpose 'Of the Civil Service system can be completely
circurnscribed.
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This ·court should not deal with this question as
one of niceties. The primary purpose of all public
authority, including this court, should he to completely
elhnina te any p'Ossibility of the use of coercion and
duress by the Chief of the Fire D·e·partment on inferior
officers to obtain their resignations.
Resignations should he entirely voluntary or they
should not be allowed to stand. Every witness that was
present at the · discussion between respondent and
Piercey states that respondent told Piercey he did
not wish to resign and would not resign. It was only
after his free will had been overcome by fear and the
coercive forces brought to bear by Chief Piercey tha.t
respondent signed the lette.r of resignation prepared by
Chief Piercey's secretary. ·Since all agree that respondent signed the letter of resignation against his express
wishes and desires, the ·only question that can remain
is, were the threats and coercive forces brought tG bear
by Piercey sufficient as matter of law to coerce and
make involuntary the resignation of respondent fro1n the
Fire Department~
The modern view of the law which will be discussed
under Point· II of this brief is that the measure of the
legal sufficiency of the threat or coercive influence is
not an objective standard such as a brave man or a man
of ordinary firmness, but is a subjective standard nleasured by the influence that the threats and coercive forces
have on the particular person from whom a·ction was
being exacted.
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POINT II.
THE LAW APPLICABLE REQUIRES THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MADE BY THE COURT.

'The .Am-erican Law Institute, R.est:atement of the
Law of Contracts, sets forth a modern definition of
duress under Sect~ovn 492 of TTol. 2. 'The definition reads
as· follows :
''Duress in the Restatement of this subject
means
"(a) any wrongful act of one person that c.oinpels a manifestation of apparent assent by
another to a transaction without his volition, or
'' (b) any wrongful threat of one person by
words or other conduct that induces another to enter into a transaction under
the influence of such fear as prec.ludes him
from exercising free will and judgment,
if the threat was intended or should
reasonably have been expected to ·operate
as an inducement.''
Anciently the law was that the duress and coercive
force had to be of such a nature as would make a brave
or courageous man submit. That rule was modified until
it required only that the coercfon be such as would cause
a person of ordinary firmness to submit. The present
American decisions have abandoned both the brave and
courageous man and ordinary firmness man standards
and make the measure of the legal sufficiency of the
duress a subjective standard. It is only nec.essary that
the ·coercive forces be sufficient to overcome. the will of
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the person being subjected to such forces. The courts
observe that the weaker and more cowardly p-ersons are
in greater need of protection than the brave, courageous
and strong individuals who are able to withstand the
force of coercive pressure. The reasoning behind the
modern rule has been set down succinctly in the case
of Ogle v. Freemarn et 1al., 150 ~an. 864, 96 P. 2d 670, 674:
''This court and many others have shown a
tendency toward liberality of definition- that is,
to relax the rigid requirements of the older rule
concerning duress. It was said in Willian1son,
Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502,
505, 94 P. 807, 808, 20 L. R. A., N. S. 484: 'Under
the modern theory, duress is to be tested, not by
the nature of the acts or threats, but rather by the
state of mind of the victim induced by such acts
and threats.' See 9 R. C. L. 716, 717. Again, the
old rule, frequently stated was that' duress is that
degree of constraint or danger, either ac-tually
inflicted, or threatened and impending, which is
sufficient in severity or in apprehension to overcome the mind of a p~erson of ordinary fir1nness.'
In a carefully considered opinion in the case of
Riney v. Doll, 116 Kan. 26, 225 P. 1059, this court
repudiated the proposition that ordinary j1:rn111ess
of mind should be included in the standard by
which to test the existence of duress. It forcefully argued that if a person imposed upon by use
of threats had a mind of less than 'ordinary firnlness' he was all the more entitled to he protected.
The court said :
'' 'The courts no\v generally recognize that
this definition is inaccurate for at least t'vo speciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fie reasons, viz. : First, experience has furnished
no yardstick by which the firmness of the human
will can be measured; and, second, even though
that could be done, one having a weak will is as
much entitled to the protection of the la:w as
though his will 'vere of ordinary firmness or of
extraordinary firmness. When one uses the bludgeon of duress to break the "\Vill of his adversary
and thereby gains a wrongful or uncons.cionahle
advantage, a court will relieve the victim of the
consequences of the act he 'vas thus forced to perform, whether his will be \vea.k, requiring but one
blow to shatter it, or whether it be of ordinary
firinness, requiring several, or· whether it be as
adamant, requiring many.' "
'The wrongful acts in the present instance consisted
of threats, both veiled and otherwise of wrongful discharge, persecution and derogatory publicity.
In subsection g. Sec. 492 of the R.est.atement of the
Law of

C·ont~acts,

page 941, the rule is laid down that

the coercive acts or threats need not be criminal or
tortious or in violation of any contractual duty if the
acts coercing a desired affirmation involve an abuse of
legal remedies or are wrongful in the moral sense and
cause fear, such acts vitiate the transaction entered into
because of the fear. There can he no doubt that the
salient purpos·es to be served hy the Civil Service Act,
under which our municipal government employees work,
could be defeated with ease if the dis.charging authority
can through th·e threat of discharge, persecution or adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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verse publicity extract a resignation from an unwilling
employee.
Coercion and duress practiced on a civil service
employee has been before the courts of the United
States on many occasions. The case which seems to be
most directly in point here is MpCarthy v. Steinkeltner
et al., 22·3 Wis. :605, 270 N. W. 551, 557. James William
1\fcCarthy, the plaintiff, brought his action for a mandatory injunction directing the chief engineer of the fire
department of the city of Milwaukee, and the board 'Of
fire and police commissioners of that city to permit him
to withdraw an application theretofore made by him for
retirement on pension upon his completion of the requisite term of service for retirement, and to reinstate hin1
to the position of assistant chief engineer of the fire
department of the city, a position whch he occupied at
the time of the filing of the application. The chief
threatened that if he did not S'O retire he would demote
l\1cCarthy from the position he held to the position of
captain in the department, without preferring any
charges against him, and without giving him opportunity for trial before the board on charges preferred,
and thereby coerced him into applying for retirement.
The case was ~efore the appellate court on appeal from
an order sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint. In reversing that order the court set forth the
facts and the law applicable in the following language:
''We are also required in passing on the
sufficiency of the complaint to determine whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it states facts sufficient to excuse the plaintiff
from the application to retire and receive a pension which the complaint states he made and
states was accepted. The plaintiff alleges that
the application was made because of a demand
of the chief that he have his application for retirement on file by June 1, 1936:, and because of
the threat of the chief that if he did not the chief
would demote him from his position of assistant
chief to that of captain. That on retirement as
assistant chief his pension vvould he one-half his
salary of $270 per month, while if he was demoted
to the rank of captain his pension ·on retirement
'vould be based upon a captain's salary of $210
per month. That the .plaintiff desired to remain·
in his position of assistant chief and that by ex- ·
perience, age, health, strength, habits, character,
and ability was competent and qualified so" to
remain. That on the chief making said threat he
requested the chief to discharge hiln and file
charges so that he might have a hearing before
the board, but the request was refused .. That at
the time he filed the application he knew the chief
had theretofore exercised the power of demotion
and he believed that the chief had such power and
believed that the -chief would carry out his said
threat if he did not retire, and so believing wa:s
coerced against his will into filng s-aid a pplication. 'That he was soon thereafter informed by
counsel that the chief did not possess any power
of demotion. That on being _so informed the
plaintiff in writing applied on June 4, 1936, to the
chief and to the board for permis-sion to withdraw
his application and asked to he reinstated to his
position of assistant chief, which application and
request was on file and before the hoard at its
regular meeting on said June 4. That the applicaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion was denied by the board at its meeting on
July 2.
''We consider that these allegations bring the
complaint within the rule respecting duress of
municipal officers p:rotected by tenure of office
provisions recently enunciated in the cases of
Schuh v. City of Waukesha, 220 Wis. 600, 265
N. W. 699; Van Gilder v. City of Madison (Wis.)
267 N. W. 25, 105 A. L. R. 244, wherein the court
relieved members of the police departments of
the defendent cities from their agreements to
waive portions of their salaries under threat of
discharge if they did not do so. An officer is as
much entitled to pTotection against salary reduction by unlawful demotion by his chief as by unlawful attempts at reduction by other city officials, and as much entitled to restoration of other
rights unlawfully attempted to be taken fro1n hin1
as to re:storation of salary, even though through
duress he for a short time submitted to those attempts."
In the case of People ex rel. 0 '·Connor v. H ardirng,
224 Ill. App. 198, 132 A. L. R.. 976, 977, the relator had
delivered to the comptroller a resignation of his civil
service position as chief clerk in the comptroller's office
under threat that unless he did so charges would be filed
against him, and 'vith the understanding that such resignation would be accepted and become effective only in
case of future misconduct, it was held that the relator
\Vas entitled to reinstate·ment where the comptroller accepted the resignation several years later, although there
had been no misconduct on the part of the chief clerk,
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the court setting forth the P'rinciple applicable, to the
case at bar in the follnwing language:

'' * * * 'Relator was given the alternative of
signing this resignation or having charges filed
against him. The filing of such charges, whether
sustained or not, would have subjected him to
serious embarrassment, inconvenience, and expense. A resignation under such 'circumstances
cannot be said to have been given by the party
resigning of his o'vn free will. Such a resignation
might have been rep·udiated at any time.' ''
There can be no dissent from the general principle
that resignations as well as any contract which has been
affirmed in response to threats, coerc~on or duress is
voidable. Ba;rn.ette v. Wells ~a:rg1o Nevada Nat. Book of
San Fr.ancisco e:t al., 270 U.S. 438, 46 S. Ct. 326; Stat:e

ex rel. Young v. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116 N. W. 486;
Kr,amer v. Police ;Oomr's., 39 Cal. App. 39·6, 179· P. 2lH;
B01ard of Eduoation v. Rose, ____ Ky. ____ , 147 S.W. (2d) 83,
132 A. L. R. 569 (See annotation also).
In Kidd v. St,ate Civil Service Commission (Cal.
App.), 55 P. 2d 245, 246, the problem p1resented to the
Civil Service Commission was similar to the case at bar.
Kidd had resigned and then withdrew his rooognition.
His immediate sup-erior refused to allow him to resume
his duties. The holding of the court was that the resignation was obtained hy duress, fraud and coercion was a
nullity and that the civil servant should be restore'd to
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his position. The facts in the Kidd case are very close to
the facts before the court. There the civil servant was
called into the office of the superintendent and in the
presence 'Of one Titlow, his resignation was demanded.
Charges against him were discussed and the servant was
informed that he would be charged with inefficiency in
his duties. He then expressed his unwillingness to resign. The superintendent then stated that if he resigned
he might be reinstated and that he would not stand in his
way but would join in the request for the civil servant's
reinstatement. The same advice came from Titlow, who
was an office m.anager in the hospital in which the civil
servant worked. The appellant asked time in which to
think the matter -over and was informed that unless he
signed a resignation at once he would be dismissed and
out of civil service for all time. After further discussion
and an assurance that the appellant would have a right
to reconsider the resignation before it became effective,
the appellant signed a resignation, effective as of October 5, 1933. The court specifically found that the appellant believed the statements of the respondent that
he would immediately be dis·charged and thereby lose his
civil service standing unless he signed the

resign~tion

at the time he complied with the demand for his resignation. When appellant requested a recommendation fron1
the respondent the recommendation was refused since it
would be inconsistent with his former act in 1·emoving
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the appellant. .Lt\ppellant thereupon file'd notice of his
withdrawal of his re·signation but this withdrawal was
not recognized and a formal termination of his service
was made as of October 5th. The court held that the
resignation was obtained by coercion and duress and
stated its findings in the following language:
''Under all these circumstances we are of the
opinion that appellant's resignation was obtained
from him under coercion and duress, and that the
same was not his free and voluntary act. State
employees holding office under civil service rules
and regulations are entitled as of right to have
such rules and regulations relative to their removal from office fairly invoked and applied.
Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 232 P. 696."
It seems obvious that the cases herein cited are in
substantial agreement with a very salutary public policy.
If department heads under civil service may, through
wrongful threats and coercive measures, obtain resignations from subordinate civil servants, they ·can
through this simple device establish a spoils system of
their own. The power of the head of a department to
harrass, annoy and produce intolerable working conditions for his subordinates is unlimited. He can by use
of his power to coerce resignations arbitrarily and
capriciously effect the removal from office of any of
his subordinates. He can defeat entirely the fine purposes of the Civil Service Act and deprive all of his subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ordinate employees of the protection which that Act is
intended to afford.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
achieved by its decision a substantial measure of justice
between the parties; that his decision is amply 'SUJ}ported by substantial evidence and his conclusions are
sound as matter of law. This Court should, theref-ore,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, W ALL.ACE, BLACK,
ROIBERTS & BLACK
DWIGH'T L. KING,
Attorneys for Respo%dent,
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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